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ISBN 90-5833-214-4Abstract in English
The media landscape is subject to substantial technological change. In this Discussion Paper we
analyse how technological trends affect the economic rationale for PSB. After identifying the
aims and nature of PSB, we derive eight possible market failures from the speciﬁc economic
characteristics of information. The changing relevance of these market failures is subsequently
discussed in the light of the technological changes. Based on this analysis, we argue that public
service broadcasting (PSB) for the digital age should be light in the sense that it has a much
smaller mandate. The main reason for this conclusion is that, due to technological developments,
many market failures in the broadcasting industry are no longer relevant. The broadcasting
market thus functions more and more like a normal market. This implies that the allocation tends
to the efﬁcient outcome, as long as consumer valuation is properly accounted for. This is not the
case when there are externalities and possibly not when it comes to valuing quality. In the
presence of these market failures, an efﬁcient allocation is not warranted in the broadcasting
industry. It is these remaining market failures that give a future PSB a right to exist.
Abstract in Dutch
Het medialandschap ondergaat belangrijke technologische veranderingen. In dit Discussion
Paper analyseren we hoe de technologische trends de economische bestaansredenen achter een
publieke omroep beïnvloeden. Nadat we de doelen en aard van een publieke omroep hebben
besproken, leiden we acht mogelijke marktfalens af uit de speciﬁeke economische
karakteristieken van informatie. De veranderende relevantie van deze marktfalens wordt
vervolgens besproken in het licht van de technologische trends. Op basis van deze analyse,
betogen wij dat de taakopdracht van een publieke omroep in de huidige, digitaliserende wereld
beperkter wordt. De belangrijkste reden hiervoor is dat door de technologische ontwikkelingen
een aantal van de marktfalens niet langer relevant is. Mediamarkten zullen in die zin steeds meer
op gewone markten gaan lijken. Dit impliceert dat een mediamarkt steeds meer uit zichzelf een
efﬁciënte allocatie zal genereren, zolang de waardering van consumenten juist wordt
meegewogen. Dit is niet het geval indien er sprake is van externaliteiten en wellicht niet wat
betreft de waardering van kwaliteit. In het geval van deze marktfalens is een efﬁciënte allocatie
niet gewaarborgd. Het bestaansrecht van een toekomstige publieke omroep vloeit voort uit deze
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6Summary
The historic rationale for PSB is based on two (possibly three) concerns. The ﬁrst concern was
that a fully market-based start of public broadcasting might not be viable, due to the public good
nature of broadcasting. A second reason for public concern was that television would be
dangerously inﬂuential and/or detrimental for moral values. The third reason could be qualiﬁed
as a combination of the ﬁrst two: the broadcasting market would not deliver the social optimal
programmes. So the concerns can be summarised as being based on market failure and
paternalism.
The rationale for PSB today might still be the same, but new motivations might have come
up and the historic rationales might have lost their relevance. We aim to analyse what the
relevant rationale for PSB is today. Our analysis leads to the following main results.
The market-failure rationale for PSB is much less important than it used to be, whereas the
paternalism-based rationale might be as relevant as before. However, implementing a PSB that is
effective in reaching its aims is going to be more difﬁcult. The diminishing relevance of the
market-failure motivation is mostly due to technological developments. First, spectrum scarcity
is by and large removed due to better (digital) compression technology and the emergence of
new transmission channels. This development alone would not do. However, it is very likely that
pay TV is going to play a much larger role in broadcasting. Pay TV, especially in combination
with more opportunities for price discrimination, is much better in translating the preferences of
viewers into programmes. Another technological factor spurring this transition is the
development of ad-avoidance technology. Rapid development and implementation is likely to
make ad-supported TV less and less viable. The major market-failure that remains relevant is the
external effects attached to viewing certain programmes. For instance, democratic performance
or social cohesion, which are often sited as being at least partially dependent on news provision.
Moreover, quality might not be well recognised by viewers and the market might supply this
sub optimally. Paternalism-based PSB is thus as relevant as before. Note that we are not arguing
how relevant this is. First of all this is a difﬁcult question for which there is little empirical
guidance. Secondly, it is a question that needs to be answered by democratic choice. We,
however, do not ﬁnd evidence that paternalistic motivations will lose weight. By paternalistic
motivations we do not refer directly to the notion of “ediﬁcation of the people”. Rather, we refer
to the imperfect ability of people to look forward and to judge (even ex post) the quality of
information like news and opinion. The ﬁnal part of our result is that it will be harder to
implement the remaining relevant goals for PSB than it would have been before the major
technological developments. Avoiding negative externalities, like programmes that incite violent
behaviour, is far more difﬁcult in a world where everybody can ‘broadcast’ any programme on
the internet. National jurisdictions have limited instruments to avoid this. It is even more
challenging to get people to consume programmes with positive externalities or those
7programmes that are ‘good’ from a paternalistic point of view.
Other results that emerge from the analysis are more methodological. The most important
result is that public service broadcasting should no longer be analysed by focusing on TV only,
but on the type of content. After all, TV is only one of the distribution channels through which
information, like a news item, can reach consumers. Hence the deﬁnition of what a relevant
market is, is going to be determined by the type of content, rather than by the distribution
channel through which this information is dispersed.
81 Introduction
Public service broadcasting (PSB) is a minor item on the government budget compared to, for
example, education. However, most people will spend more time watching television over their
lifetime than they spend in a classroom. In this sense, television, and what appears on the screen,
is very important. Discussions about the quality, or the lack thereof, of the programmes are of all
times. Proposed changes in the rules of the game - especially when it concerns changing public
service broadcasting - lead to very emotional debates. This paper systematically reviews the case
for PSB, taking into account the major changes that have occurred since the introduction of
PSB.1
Though discussions about PSB are of all times, a review of the case for PSB has particular
urgency now. First of all, the urgency relates to technological changes. We are at the verge of the
long predicted convergence between television and the computer. New transmission networks
arise (digital TV etc.) and the capacity constraint in content distribution seems no longer
binding. Second, there is a direct policy urgency. In the UK, the BBC’s charter renewal is being
discussed. In The Netherlands the government will speak out on the future of PSB in the
summer of 2005. In many other EU-countries it seems that public support for PSB is eroding,
which leads to discussions about public ﬁnancing.
The historic rationale for PSB is based on two (possibly three) concerns. The ﬁrst concern
was that a fully market-based start of public broadcasting might not be viable, due to the public
good nature of broadcasting.2 A second reason for public concern was that television would be
dangerously inﬂuential and/or detrimental for moral values. A quote of a chairman of a radio
broadcasting organisation who went to the UK to see if they should start broadcasting television
is also telling: “It’s rubbish, it’s only skin-deep. I don’t want to talk about it any further.”3 Public
intervention was ‘needed’ to avoid this and to make TV into something that would edify the
masses. The third reason could be qualiﬁed as a combination of the ﬁrst two: the broadcasting
market would not deliver the social optimal programmes. So the concerns can be summarised as
being based on market failure and paternalism.
The rationale for PSB today might still be the same, but new motivations might have come up
and the historic rationales might have lost their relevance. We aim to analyse what the relevant
rationale for PSB is today. The next section provides a historic overview. Section 3 is more
1 This paper beneﬁted from comments by Marcel Canoy and Rick van der Ploeg. The paper builds on insights from
Nahuis et al. (2005) but focuses on the role of the PSB and has a more European perspective.
2 Not only the difﬁculty of pricing was an issue. The coordination problem was also important; for television sets to be
sold, a sufﬁcient amount of programmes should be produced and broadcast. Philips lobbied intensively with the Dutch
government to start a national broadcasting organisation, such that the demand for television could get the necessary big
push in The Netherlands. Source: Andere Tijden 23 September 2003.
3 Translated from Dutch, quoted in Andere Tijden 23 September 2003.
9explicit about what governments aims at with PSB and how these goals can be translated in
economic terms. Section 4 gives an overview of the economics of media with a focus on how
well the market performs under different regimes, like advertisement support and pay TV.
Section 5 discusses how developments in technology and demand affect the performance of the
broadcasting market, after which we derive the current rationale for PSB.
The analysis leads to the following main result. The market-failure rationale for PSB is much
less important than it used to be, whereas the paternalism-based rationale might be as relevant as
before. However, implementing a PSB that is effective in reaching its aims is going to be more
difﬁcult. The diminishing relevance of the market-failure motivation is mostly due to
technological developments. First, spectrum scarcity is by and large removed due to better
(digital) compression technology and the emergence of new transmission channels. This
development alone would not do. However, it is very likely that pay TV is going to play a much
larger role in ‘broadcasting.’4 Pay TV, especially in combination with more opportunities for
price discrimination, is much better in translating the preferences of viewers into programmes.
There is one caveat to this prediction. The transition of ad-supported TV to pay TV depends
(among other things) on the protection of copyrights. If instant copying is not avoidable, pay TV
is not viable. This depends on encryption technologies, prevailing law and law enforcement.
Another technological factor spurring this transition is the development of ad-avoidance
technology. Rapid development and implementation is likely to make ad-supported TV less and
less viable. The major market-failure that remains relevant is the external effects attached to
viewing certain programmes. For instance, democratic performance or social cohesion, which
are often sited as being at least partially dependent on news provision.
Moreover, quality might not be well recognised by viewers and the market might supply this
sub optimally. Paternalism-based PSB is thus as relevant as before. Note that we are not arguing
how relevant this is. First of all this is a difﬁcult question for which there is little empirical
guidance. Secondly, it is a question that needs to be answered by democratic choice. We,
however, do not ﬁnd evidence that paternalistic motivations will lose weight. By paternalistic
motivations we do not refer directly to the notion of “ediﬁcation of the people”. Rather, we refer
to the imperfect ability of people to look forward and to judge (even ex post) the quality of
information like news and opinion. The ﬁnal part of our result is that it will be harder to
implement the remaining relevant goals for PSB than it would have been before the major
technological developments. Avoiding negative externalities, like programmes that incite violent
behaviour, is far more difﬁcult in a world where everybody can ‘broadcast’ any programme on
the internet. National jurisdictions have limited instruments to avoid this (see Hoefnagel, 2002).
It is even more challenging to get people to consume programmes with positive externalities or
4 Some authors refer to pay TV as narrowcasting, we do not follow this.
10those programmes that are ‘good’ from a paternalistic point of view. In section 6 we discuss the
possibilities and impossibilities of actually implementing a PSB that is in line with the rationale.
Other results that emerge from the analysis are more methodological. The most important
result is that public service broadcasting should no longer be analysed by focusing on TV only,
but on the type of content. After all, TV is only one of the distribution channels through which
information, like a news item, can reach consumers. Hence the deﬁnition of what a relevant
market is, is going to be determined by the type of content, rather than by the distribution
channel through which this information is dispersed.
This paper relates to an extensive literature on the economics of the media. We do not
provide an extensive discussion of these papers here as that literature discusses very speciﬁc
models or details of the question we adress. This literature is discussed in the main text.
Literature that adresses the more general question on the rationale for PSB is much more
scarce. One exception is a recent article by Hargreaves Heap (2005) that argues that although we
are progressing towards, what Hargreaves Heap calls, a multi-channel world characterised by
competition, there remains a case for a ‘dedicated’ public service broadcasters. His main point is
that a future PSB should have a clearer assignment, in the sense that performance indicators need
to be improved. His article formulates some suggestions on how to be more speciﬁc about these
indicators. In contrast to Hargreaves Heap, we discuss the theory on the economic rationales
behind various market failures very explicitly. Another more general discussion on the role of
PSB in Europe is O’Hagen and Jennings (2003). They focus on differences in the way PSBs are
ﬁnanced and how that inﬂuences their public service content. We add to their paper an explicit
account of the changes in the media landscape and a much more explicit discussion of the
theory. Finally, Polo (2004) discusses different regulatory measures to enhance pluralism, one of
them being having a PSB.5
5 Other more general papers are: European Commission (1999), which discusses the Community’s audiovisual policy in
the digital age, Motta and Polo (1997) who focus on competition policy for the media markets and Anderson and
Gabszewicz (2004) who discuss the two-sided nature of media markets.
11122 A brief history of PSB in Europe
2.1 The origin of PSB
In 1923, associates of radio-visionary David Sarnoff scorned his plea for investment in radio
technology, reportedly by stating: “The wireless music box has no imaginable commercial value.
Who would pay for a message sent to nobody in particular?” As David Sarnoff proved during
the 1920s (he became a successful man in radio, and later television), his associates were wrong.
It was the era in which radio broadcasting became popular, after its invention in the early 20th
century. In the United States, as in Europe, radio was a matter of private broadcasters. In the US,
this basically hasn’t changed; the market for media products is by and large approached as any
other market.
In Europe however, there has been a tradition of public service broadcasting (PSB), one
could say since the invention of radio and the realization of its potential for education or
agitation (keep in mind the unsteady 1920s and 30s). The ‘mother’ of PSB - the BBC in the
United Kingdom - saw the light of day as early as 1927. Roughly, we can sketch the following
history, which is representative for most European countries.
As said, the ﬁrst radio broadcasters were private initiatives. Not per se commercial, some
were founded by associations of listeners and enthusiasts or by public interest groups.6 Soon
thereafter, during the 1930s, governments started interfering by establishing public channels.
The dominant model was a public radio monopoly, which was adopted during the 1940s by
nearly all countries. Radio increasingly became an instrument of the state. On the one hand to
provide for the public good ( i.e. to educate), but on the other hand as a propaganda tool. The
most striking example of the latter being Nazi-Germany, but other European countries were not
shy to use the power of mass communication either. After the war, it was slowly realised that
direct inﬂuence of the state on broadcasting was not always desirable, but the role of
broadcasting for reconstruction and ‘social ediﬁcation’ remained strong. In some countries a
PSB with more independence evolved, though all broadcasters were still state owned
monopolies.
The after-war years were also marked by the introduction of television. The same public
radio broadcasters smoothly expanded their monopoly role to TV. In the 1960s the landscape
started to open up. Part of the challenge came from pirates (illegal broadcasters) that appeared
on the airwaves, mostly operating radio stations. Another challenge was the introduction of
cable television and satellite as alternative platforms to terrestrial broadcasting. These challenges
made the trend to more open broadcasting systems persevere. The 1980s saw the introduction of
6 In fact, also the BBC started of as a private ﬁrm, the British Broadcasting Company, before its transformation to a public
Corporation. The Company was founded by manufacturers of radio equipment, as a means to increase sales.
13(private) pay TV channels in some countries, and of course the ﬁrst commercial channels on the
open network. By the late 1980s, early 1990s the breakdown of the public monopoly was a fact.
Between the inception of PSB and the 1980s, the way society and the government saw the
role of and logic behind PSB constantly changed. However, up to the 1980s, the economic
perspective on broadcasting in essence didn’t evolve very much. The turning point came with
the opening up of the broadcasting system: the competition viewpoint became more and more
relevant. The European Commission also took part in this change in perspective with the ﬁrst
Television without frontiers directive, which focused on the media market and its liberalisation.
Current trends of digitalisation and platform convergence only emphasise the need for the
competition point of view.
As a side-step, it needs to be said that one particular issue always did get economic attention.
This is the so called spectrum constraint, which had major impact on the organisation of
broadcasting. Early radio and television technology allowed only for a very limited number of
channels. Over the decades the constraint has become less and less stringent. The new digital
broadcasting technologies make the constraint virtually non-existent.
Note the striking contrast of the development of PSB in Europe with the situation in the United
States. From the outset, the US have chosen for a free market for broadcasting. PSB had a very
slow start, and never reached a level of funding comparable with European PSB. This has
everything to do with the vision of PSB in the US: it is seen as an additional service to existing
commercial initiatives, that strictly should provide those programmes that are not provided in the
market.7 After the inception of radio the default in Europe quickly became public provision; in
the US private provision.
This distinction is relevant since generally the raison d’être of PSB - in economic terms - is
related back to the product characteristics of information and the state of technology. The latter
was relevant since it produced a restriction on supply (the spectrum constraint). The most
relevant product characteristic, which is also closely related to technology, is the non-excludable
nature of information. Basically, everybody who has receiver equipment can receive a broadcast.
This means it is impossible to ask a price for any speciﬁc programme or channel (in any case,
given the technology up to the 1980s). The relevant point here is not to discuss these constraints
in detail, but to highlight the fact that given these constraints, at least two general options were
available. PSB may have been a logical choice, but it is not an inevitability dictated by the
market characteristics. This is shown by the American alternative.
7 For instance, educational programmes have always been a focal point of US PSB.
142.2 The assignment of PSB
So we’ve established that PSB is not the only possible response to the technological and product
characteristics. Much depends on the role that society - usually: the government - adheres to
broadcasting. In Europe these objectives are much more ambitious that in the US. Given this role
and the objectives for broadcasting, PSB is one way to achieve these objectives. However, in the
current media landscape, other public policy choices are also available.8 This would imply that
also private broadcasters are subject to certain government constraints. Indeed, nowadays a fair
amount of hybrid forms are visible in Europe: e.g. public channels with (partial) ﬁnancing
through advertisements and private channels with public service obligations, and in general a
coexistence of public and private (commercial) channels. However, PSB still plays a large, often
dominant role in most countries. This raises the question about what PSB entails. For a short
answer to that question, the words of John Reith, founder of the BBC, used in 1927 are still
relevant today: PSB has the assignment “to inform, to educate and to entertain”. The European
Commission deﬁnes PSB as follows:9
Public Service Broadcaster means a broadcaster with a public service mandate. (...)
Such a mandate would be consistent with the objective of fulﬁlling the democratic, social
and cultural needs of a particular society and guaranteeing pluralism, including cultural
and linguistic diversity. To fulﬁl this mandate, the public broadcaster beneﬁts from
license fees or direct ﬁnancial support from the State.
There are two distinguishing elements in this deﬁnition: a mandate and some form of public
ﬁnancing. Note however that ownership is not mentioned as a relevant characteristic. Every
country has its own particular interpretation of the public service objectives. In the next section
the general categories of these objectives will be discussed in an economic framework. First,
however, we will provide a quick overview of the different organisational forms of PSB that
co-exist in Europe. This is by no means a full discussion, merely a quick overview to give some
perspective on the discussion that follows.
2.3 Varieties of the PSB model
For sake of simplicity, we describe three alternative models of PSB.10 In general we can
distinguish between heavy regulation (e.g. Netherlands, France) and lighter regulation
8 Consider for instance programme requirements and quota’s, speciﬁc subsidies and advertisement regulation.
9 See the web site of the European Union, http://europe.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/.
10 General regulations that most countries have for both public and private television are not discussed here. This applies
for instance for regulation of programming of violent or offensive content, of sponsoring or on maximum hours of
advertising per day.
15(Germany, Denmark), regulation on programmes (Netherlands, Flanders) or production (France,
the Walloon provinces in Belgium) and internal (England, Germany) or external mandate
supervision (Denmark, Norway). (European Institute for the Media (2002))
The BBC model
As said, the BBC is the oldest public service broadcaster around. With the design of the BBC, its
independent status (free from political or commercial interference) was deemed very important.
Therefore it is established by the crown and not by parliament, which means it is constitutionally
separated from the government. The way this is done is by making it a public corporation, which
is run by governors who act as trustees. These governors are appointed by the government, and
their role is to “represent the public interest, notably the interests of viewers and listeners. (...)
They are accountable to BBC licence payers and Parliament (...).”11 As for ﬁnancing, a license
fee was introduced. This means that users (owners of receiver equipment) pay directly for the
service, rather than having direct government control over the broadcaster’s budget. Advertising
is not allowed on the BBC.12
The mandate of the BBC is fairly general and not formulated in terms of additionality (to
commercially delivered programming). Supervision on the fulﬁlment of the BBC-mandate is
internal. Monitoring employs both qualitative and quantitative yardsticks, and audience
consultations are part of the process.
For the commercial channels, there is a separate regulatory body. Companies are free to
obtain licences for new commercial channels. However, commercial channels are also under
certain programme obligations. These range from taste and decency guidelines to programme
diversity requirements.13 Note that Channel 4 (C4) in the UK is also a PSB; it is established as a
public corporation. C4 is ﬁnanced exclusively by advertising revenues, and has a heavy public
service remit deﬁned in terms of additionality: C4 ﬁlls the gaps (in programmes and targeted
audiences) that other UK broadcasters leave open.
The Dutch model
The Dutch model is characterised by a hybrid public/private structure. The PSB is basically
made up of a number of private broadcast associations of viewers (members), who share a public
licence which is ofﬁcially handed to one ‘overall broadcaster’, the NOS. The licence is granted
by the Department of Culture, which also stipulates the programme requirements in the Media
Act. The licence is accompanied by a PSB subsidy, although until recently this was a licence
11 Quote from the BBC web site, http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/running/, which is a summarised version of the Royal Charter
under which the BBC is established.
12 The BBC runs some commercial services (like BBC World), which are solely ﬁnanced by advertising. Its proﬁts ﬂow
into the BBC and also beneﬁt the public channels.
13 For instance, the licence agreement will stipulate that a high quality news programme is broadcast at peak hours.
16fee.14 The PSB structure is in principle open to new associations, if they have a certain number
of members and if the Minister of Culture deems their programming ‘additional’. Apart from the
subsidy, an roughly equal amount of funding is obtained through advertising on the three public
channels. The mandate of the PSB is broad (no additionality rules) and has rather speciﬁc
targets, which are however not quantiﬁed or ranked in terms of priority. The broadcasters
participating in the PSB have a collective responsibility for meeting the mandate. Since there are
no clear-cut targets, the assessment of whether the mandate is met is open to political debate. For
clarity, there is no political inﬂuence on any individual broadcasts or broadcaster.
A distinctive feature of the Dutch model is the position of viewers, in the sense that they can
become a member of a certain broadcast association. The associations each have a certain
identity, which in principle is based on a particular philosophy of life. In actual fact, the
associations are more based on the historical stratiﬁcation of society, rather than the current
stratiﬁcation. In any case, by becoming a member, the viewer can support a particular
association and guarantee its position in the PSB. In practice, the inﬂuence of members is very
limited; they have hardly any inﬂuence over the assignment of air time to the various
associations nor any inﬂuence on programming decisions.
The supervision of the Media Act is external; there is one regulatory body for both public
and commercial channels. Commercial channels can freely be established, and are only under
minimal regulation, which entails no public service requirements.
The German model
Because of its decentralised nature, the setup of the German PSB system is rather different than
in most European countries. The länder (the Federal states) have autonomy over cultural
matters, hence also over broadcasting. There is therefore a variety of regulatory structures for the
regional broadcasters. Together, they form two national channels, ZDF and ARD.15 The ARD is
organised as an American style network, so it is made up of regional organisations. The ZDF is a
national (interstate) channel, which is governed by a body that represents the regional states.
A central theme is the role of a governing council in each state, the appointment of which is
taken care of by the state parliaments. However, the governing council is not a political body,
since the aim is that it is independent from the government. The composition of the council is
meant to be some cross section of society, in which the different social groups that make up civil
society are represented (European Institute for the Media (2002)). The council supervises the
execution of the public service mandate. The commercial sector is also regulated at the state
level, and also by some council. However, there is a strict separation in regulation of public and
commercial channels.
14 The ofﬁcial argument for abolishing the licence fee was to save on transaction costs related to the collection of the fee
and the difﬁculty of monitoring who owns a receiver.
15 There are also several thematic national channels, like a cultural or a children’s channel.
17The heart of the public service mandate is described in a treaty that is ratiﬁed by all länder. The
treaty states that each broadcaster should provide a comprehensive service and also should
encourage plurality of opinion. These principles hold for both public and private broadcasters.
The public service mandate (only for PSBs) is further determined by subsequent rulings of the
Constitutional Court. This prescribes the breadth of the programming, for instance stating that
programming should not be restricted to news and culture, but should also include entertainment
(i.e. no pure additionality to commercial programming). These programming rules are not
speciﬁed in detail or in quota though, only in principle. The actual decisions are taken by the
directors of the different PSBs, who are appointed and are held accountable by the governing
councils.
The PSBs are primarily ﬁnanced by a licence fee. The amount of the fee is determined by an
expert committee, which assesses whether a broadcaster is spending its money efﬁciently.
Advertising and sponsoring are also permitted, but only to a limited extend (for instance, no
advertisements are allowed during the evening programming).
183 What is the aim of PSB?
PSB should aim at those media objectives that are not sufﬁciently met by unregulated markets.
Typical media objectives are pluralism and diversity, independence, quality and accessibility.
The wish to correct for potential market failures is not the only motivation underlying these
objectives. Paternalism also plays a role in media policy making. The government may, for
instance, wish to encourage the consumption of arts in order to uplift its people. Finally, the
demand for certain events or news items may be so universal that the government thinks that
everyone should have access to it, regardless of income. The underlying rationale is then much
more equity rather than efﬁciency based.
Notwithstanding that these media objectives are based on economic or non-economic
motivations, their interpretation can be cast in economic terms. In what follows we analyse the
objectives from an economic point of view and investigate their relevance for various types of
content. We distinguish four types of content: news and opinion, culture, entertainment and
speciﬁc information (about, e.g., hobbies, tourism, health). As we will show, this distinction is
primarily based on differences in the signiﬁcance of market failures and differences in the
relevance of the media policy objectives.
3.1 Pluralism and diversity
Pluralism and diversity refer to the extent that media supply reﬂects the variety in ideologies,
communities and preferences within the society. In economic terms, this objective can be
translated as the match between the heterogeneity in supply and in demand. This objective is
relevant for all types of content.
3.2 Independence
This objective is met if content is generated independently of political or other inﬂuences that
may bias the information. Independence is especially an issue under asymmetric information,
when the consumer can or does not know about interests that bias the information. The
economic interpretation of this objective is that incentives should be such that independent
content provision pays off.16
As independent media enhance the democratic process, this objective is particularly relevant
for news and opinion. Independent provision of speciﬁc information may entail external effects
as well. Think, for instance, of the possible consequences of unreliable information on health
issues.
16 Note that independence should not be confused with impartiality or with being unprejudiced. A medium can provide
information motivated by a certain vision or by commercial incentives. But as long as this is clear, independence is not
affected.
193.3 Quality
Quality is highly subjective and can be interpreted in many ways: aesthetically, professionally,
or in relation to the utility of the end users. In economic terms, quality is a product characteristic
of content that is related to the preferences of the buyer. The motivation why it is a policy
objective is to some extent paternalistic: the consumption of high quality content is supposed to
be inherently good. But externalities may also be involved here, in the sense that high quality
content could enhance the democracy, whereas low quality content could, e.g., provoke
irresponsible behaviour. A second economic dimension of quality is that its production usually
involves relatively high ﬁxed costs. The quality objective is most relevant for news and opinion
and culture.
3.4 Accessibility
Accessibility to live coverage of national events or other widely demanded content can be
limited due to the prices being charged in an unregulated market. The government may consider
this undesirable, because having access to these events and content is often viewed as a basic
right. The underlying motivation is thus not economic, but more of an equity nature. It has much
more to do with redistribution of wealth rather than with promoting efﬁciency. Accessibility is
mostly relevant for news and opinion but possibly also for some forms of entertainment.
3.5 Conclusion
Governments aim at independent media that provide diverse, accessible and high-quality
content. Unregulated media markets could produce outcomes that do not sufﬁciently meet these
media policy objectives. The role of PSB can be seen as to correct for these potential
shortcomings. But under which conditions and to what extent do these shortcomings actually
arise in the market for information goods? The next section deals with this question.
204 The economics of information (a graphical exposition)
This section describes the key features of the economics of information.17 Information is the
good that is produced, traded and consumed in the broadcasting industry. We give a short
description of the key differences between information and a standard good described in
economic models, such as a pizza, when we discuss the supply side of the broadcasting industry.
Further, we discuss the trade mechanisms that prevail in the broadcasting market and discuss
speciﬁc features of media consumption. By then we will be fully equipped to describe the
market failures that may prevail.
Key features of the information good: an introductory overview
There are four key differences between information and pizzas. The ﬁrst one is that each time
someone consumes a pizza, the producer has to make a new one. With a TV-programme, one
additional person viewing does not invoke any additional costs on the producer. Thus
information is non-rival as the marginal costs are zero. More speciﬁcally, there are relatively
high ﬁxed costs and very low marginal costs. Second, if you order a pizza, you know pretty well
what you will get. If you watch a movie, only after consumption your true valuation is known.
Hence there is information asymmetry. Third, for some information it is difﬁcult to exclude
users. Anyone with a TV-set and an antenna can consume broadcast programmes. With a pizza
exclusion is much easier. Finally, the consumption of a pizza does not generate substantial
external effect whereas with the consumption of information this might be the case. For example
programmes with a lot of violence might induce violent behaviour.
4.1 The supply side
The production of broadcasting is usefully described as consisting of three stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, content is produced, such as making a movie, a news report or ﬁlming an event. In the
next stage the content is bundled: combining different types of content to a channel (or possibly
a pay-per-view package where the viewer can pick his or her selected programme(s)). Third, the
packaged content is transmitted to consumers or households. This is done either by cable,
satellite, terrestrial or some sort of broadband. If the stages are not integrated there are ﬂows of
payments between the producers in the different stages. The direction of the monetary ﬂow,
however, is not necessarily upward only. It is, for example, possible that channels are charged
for using scarce transmission capacity.
Somewhere in these three stages revenue should be generated from consumer payments, one
way or the other. There is one direct method, that is pay TV and there are two indirect methods.
17 For a general overview of the economics of information, see Shapiro and Varian (1998).
21Consumers pay indirectly by viewing advertisements; then the advertisers are charged for using
airtime. Or consumers pay indirectly through the tax system.18
The broadcasting industry is characterized by substantial ﬁxed costs. This holds true for all
stages of the production column. Content for example, once produced, has a marginal cost of
zero. Essentially, viewing a programme is a non-rival activity. Similarly for transmission: once
the investment in a cable network is sunk, transmission costs are very low. The (ﬁxed)
production costs, however, might well be increasing in reaching a larger audience. In the
remainder we focus on content production, however, and we thus do not discuss the stages
separately, as this is not necessary for our main line of reasoning.19 The high-ﬁxed low-marginal
cost structure affects market functioning in two important ways. First, in general a cost structure
with economies of scale tends to lead to concentrated markets. For content production this
tendency is somewhat less relevant as the ﬁxed costs have to be incurred over and over again.20
Second, allocative efﬁciency requires pricing equal to marginal costs. The consumer with a
willingness to pay which just exceeds zero should be served in order to maximize social welfare.
A price of zero, however, is inconsistent with ﬁrms recovering their average costs. Hence, such a
price does not lead to a viable industry. The different strategies of ﬁrms to still make positive
proﬁts are discussed in the next subsection. Before we can discuss these we need to stress a
second feature of information goods.
Non-excludability is a second feature that is sometimes relevant for information goods.
Non-excludability implies that the owner of a good cannot exclude users from enjoying their
product. Non-excludability and non-rivalry together are crucial characteristics of public goods.
The past developments in the broadcasting industry can only be understood by discussing
non-excludability (see also the section on ‘a brief history’). Especially with terrestrial
transmission - important still in many countries - excluding users is difﬁcult or costly. True
non-excludability rules out any use of direct pricing. The non-excludability is not only relevant
for understanding the historical development, but is still relevant as the cheap copying
opportunities and free de-scrambling methods undermine the possibilities for charging
consumers.
18 This is possibly done by a licence fee, as in the UK, or by higher general taxes, as is the case in The Netherlands.
19 See Motta and Polo (1997) for an elaborate discussion of the consequences for competition policy due to high ﬁxed
costs in the different stages of the production of broadcasting.
20 Of course, this tendency is also present in content production. Think of Reuters, CNN etc, but in all these cases the
news still has be to adjusted to speciﬁc local tastes. Note that these oligopolistic ﬁrms make use of scale effects. From a
social welfare point of view, this is not necessarily a bad thing.
224.2 Trading information: On pluralism and diversity
Information ‘trade’ in the broadcasting market is possible by free-to-air broadcasting (with or
without advertisements), by means of a pay-per-view or pay TV channel, or a mixture of these
systems. In this section we discuss the allocative efﬁciency of these different transactions. We
only brieﬂy touch upon the issue of why the different systems are present in different market
segments.
A general discussion of advertising supported TV could be guided by a formal model. We,
however, argue that a discussion of the general trade-offs is more fruitful. The reason being that
there is a myriad of models with different set-ups without any consensus about what is relevant
(just to given an idea, there exist Hotelling-beach, Salop-circle, duopoly and monopolistic
competition models which either do or do not model the advertising market explicitly and which
do or do not model quality choice etc.). So we prefer to discuss the general insights and
trade-offs in greater detail, while the speciﬁc results are discussed in footnotes.21
4.2.1 Advertising
There are several reasons why advertising can be an important revenue generating mechanism in
(parts of) the broadcasting industry. First, technical difﬁculties related to exclusion can make the
use of a price mechanism expensive or even impossible. In that case, and in the absence of
subsidies or donations, ads are the only available means of generating revenues. Second,
resorting to ads for revenues might simply be more proﬁtable than any possible pricing policy.
Third, pricing might be more proﬁtable ex post but not ex ante. This is easily understood by the
following example. For pay TV to be viable, a sufﬁcient number of households should have a
decoder. For households to buy a decoder, a sufﬁcient number of pay TV channels should be
available. This coordination problem might cause ad-support to be the only viable mechanism.
Let us ﬁrst consider the basics that determine the allocation of programmes under ad support.
Figure 4.1 depicts demand curve DS, representing demand for sports. The vertical axis shows the
willingness to pay (u) and the horizontal axis the number of viewers (n). Hence, each potential
consumer either consumes one unit of sports or zero units. The ﬁxed cost of producing the
programme, F, are represented as a square, ˜ n ˜ u, in the ﬁgure. Obviously, welfare maximisation
requires the programme to be produced: triangles A+B represent the maximum possible
surplus. With advertising support it is easy to calculate the minimum per-informed-consumer ad
price for the programme to be produced and broadcast: PA
Min ≥ ˜ n ˜ u
¯ n = 1
2 ˜ u (note that at a price zero
¯ n viewers watch). Thus PA
Min is the price per viewer, that the producers should get to just recover
the ﬁxed costs (with associated revenue of PA
Min ¯ n).
21 A more general discussion needs to take into account: competition between suppliers, substitution of viewers between
different programmes, competition on the advertising market etc.
23Figure 4.1 Programme allocation under ad support
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There is nothing that guarantees that the ad price is indeed sufﬁciently high. Therefore when one
thinks about the allocation of programmes in general, it is likely not very efﬁcient as the
informative role of the price system in a regular market is not very accurately taken over by the
price of ads. Indeed, there need not be any relation between total willingness to pay for the
programme by viewers and the value of them viewing ads to the company trying to sell
something. Only the number22 of viewers counts, not their willingness to pay for the
programme. Owen and Wildman (1992) formulate this very eloquent “The ﬁrst and most serious
mistake that an analyst of the television industry can make is to assume that
advertising-supported television broadcasters are in business to broadcast programmes. They are
not. Broadcasters are in the business of producing audiences. These audiences, or means of
access to them, are sold to advertisers.” Figure 4.1 (part B) illustrates that the minimum ad price
PA0
Min > PA
Min should be higher when the total number of viewers is smaller, despite the fact that
the total valuation for sports is the same (the ﬁgure is constructed such that A+B = A0+B0).23
Possible market failure 1 If the price of advertising is relatively low, some socially valuable
programmes will not be broadcasted under advertising support. More speciﬁcally there is a bias
against programmes with a high valuation by a small potential audience.
Before we turn to a more general discussion of advertising supported TV, it is important to take a
few moments to think about ads. In discussing Figure 4.1 we assumed ads are something
completely neutral, in the sense that they need not be taken into account for the welfare analysis.
22 Of course, their budget, or inﬂuence on how the budget is spent, matters.
23 See Spence and Owen (1977) for a more general analysis.
24This shortcut is made for expositional ease only. But ads are not broadcast without a purpose.
Firms are willing to pay for broadcasting ads. Now, if the value of the ad exceeds the disutility of
watching the ad, advertisements add to social surplus. To think about the value of ads, we can
consider three types of ads: informative, manipulative and signalling or persuasion ads.
Informative ads make people aware of the existence of a good (or good-price combination) that
make some of them change there buying decision (read: get a higher utility from their spending
funds). Basically these ads improve the allocative efﬁciency in the rest of the economy.
Manipulative ads change consumers’ utility functions and are generally bad for welfare, see
Dixit and Norman (1979) for an extensive analysis. Signalling or persuasion ads do not inform
consumers about new products but they can signal quality. The reasoning is as follows: a heavily
advertised product must be a good product, because if it were a bad product no repeat purchases
would occur. Without repeat purchases, heavy advertising would not be a proﬁtable strategy,
hence the product must be good. This interpretation of advertising also leads to less ‘wrong’
buying decisions and hence less inefﬁciency.
Competition leads to a tendency for duplication. Suppose there are two channels and two types
of programmes, Sport (S) and Culture (C), and 80% of the potential viewers prefer to see sports.
Channel 1 broadcasts sports. Channel 2 then chooses between S andC, where the ﬁrst choice
gives them 40% audience (half of the sports minded) whereasC gives them 20% only. Hence,
they duplicate. This is inefﬁcient; the inefﬁciency arises from the fact that Channel 2 ignores that
it takes away half of the viewers of Channel 1. This is the familiar business-stealing effect (see
Mankiw and Whinston (1986)). A monopolist would broadcast S andC, given that the ﬁxed cost
of producingC is sufﬁciently low.24
A second aspect related to ad-supported tv is that duplication of programmes, with
consumers disliking ads, leads to very tough competition for viewers. This insight mitigates the
tendency for duplication. Let us follow the previous example. Suppose both Channel 1 and 2
broadcast S. If people dislike ads, they watch the sports programme with the least ads, say - for
some reason - that is Channel 2. If the viewer-ad elasticity is sufﬁciently high, Channel 1 will
respond by lowering its amount of ads and a type of Bertrand-Nash outcome would be the result.
Hence, one of the channels could do better by broadcastingC.25 This is not the only possible
setting. The story might go the other way round if programmes are bad substitutes (the
viewer-ad elasticity is low). This example leads us to a discussion of excessive advertising.
Whether advertising is excessive or not, depends on the answer to three questions: (i) are ads
a big nuisance to viewers? (ii) how high is the social value of ads? (iii) are different contents or
programmes good substitutes? The relevance of the ﬁrst two questions is rather obvious. The
24 See Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and George (2001) for evidence that the trade-off between competition and diversity is
relevant empirically.
25 See Anderson and Coate (2005), for a more extensive discussion.
25interplay of these with the last question deserves some elaboration.
Figure 4.2 Are programmes substitutes?
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Suppose the alternative programmes on Channel 1 and 2 are relatively bad substitutes, S andC
for example (Figure 4.2 (A)). Let us just focus on the choice between Channel 1 and 2 (and not
on watching tv or doing something else). If Channel 1 increases its ad volume, Channel 2 will
respond by increasing their ad volume, as the loss of doing so is decreased due to the larger ad
volume on Channel 1. Hence, if the programmes are bad substitutes, ads are strategic
complements and excessive advertising is the outcome (the social optimal amount of ads is
sketched by the dashed line, assuming that the value of ads is relatively low to the incurred
nuisance). If programmes are good substitutes, the equilibrium might be characterised by too
low advertising (if the social value of advertising is positive, see ﬁgure 4.2, panel B).
Possible market failure 2 Due to the possibly negative nuisance externality imposed upon
viewers with advertising supported TV, there might be excessive advertising.
Above, we illustrated our case with two channels only. How important is the number of
channels? If there is a limited number of channels, ad-supported TV leads to excess proﬁts for
the owners of the channels,26 something which is far less plausible if the number of channels is
very large. This distributional issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
The speciﬁc analysis of Spence and Owen (1977) builds on monopolistic competition with a
given ad price. They show that, with a move towards more channels, the duplication problem
discussed above is mitigated. However, the tendency toward excessive advertising is
strengthened. As a larger variety of choice leads to a better ﬁt with speciﬁc consumer tastes,
26 This does not hold true if the licences are auctioned.
26consumers are less likely to switch to other programmes and therefore react less sensitively to
increased advertising. Moreover, the analysis of multiple channels shows that more channels
lead to more variety, but the weak incentives – due to the lack of price-information – for the
optimal allocation stand upright.
4.2.2 Pay TV
Pay TV requires that some conditional access technology makes the good excludable.27 The
crucial difference between pay TV and ad-supported TV is that the price mechanism plays its
role. Prices transfer some information about consumer valuation. In general this makes the
allocative efﬁciency of pay TV exceed that of ad-supported TV.28 It is, however, immediately
clear that static efﬁciency will not be possible due to the speciﬁc cost structure. Equilibrium
prices will exceed marginal costs, and thereby exclude viewers whose willingness to pay is
larger than the marginal costs.
Possible market failure 3 With pay TV some viewers are inefﬁciently excluded.
Figure 4.3 (A) provides an example of pay TV with a monopolist. Again, consider the demand
for sports, as in Figure 4.1. The monopolist sets the optimal price where the marginal beneﬁts
equal marginal costs (of zero): the price is ˜ u and the size of the audience is ˜ n. So the revenues
exactly equal the ﬁxed costs in this example. However, there is a welfare loss equal to B as
viewers with a positive valuation, but below ˜ u, are excluded.
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27 In most of the analysis, we do not distinguish between pay-per-view and pay TV. Only in section 4.2.2 we make the
explicit distinction.
28 It is, however, very simple to construct counterexamples where this is not the case. We will discuss these in a moment.
27Now, consider panel B where we assume that the ﬁxed costs are slightly higher (indicated by the
added dashed part in panel B). The monopolist will not be able to recoup the ﬁxed costs by
setting his optimal price ˜ p∗. The programme, however, is socially desirable, as A00+B00 is much
larger than the small rectangle that we added to the ﬁxed costs. The optimal price for the
monopolist (and hence his revenue) is not affected by the higher ﬁxed cost. Note, that a
sufﬁciently high ad price (for example an ad price equal to ˜ u) would ensure production, as then
everybody with a positive valuation will watch the programme, generating a revenue larger than
F0. As discussed in section 3, high-quality programmes tend to be high-cost programmes. The
analysis above thus indicates that high-quality programmes tend to be undersupplied in the
market.29 This is especially so, if high-quality programmes are not ‘properly’ valued by
consumers.30
Possible market failure 4 With pay TV some socially desirable (high-quality) programmes
might not be produced.
Also related to the speciﬁc cost structure is the possibility that there is excessive entry on the
market. In contrast to market failure 3 and 4 - where not all consumer valuation is taken into
account - this market failure is due to the entrant ignoring that it affects the proﬁtability of other
ﬁrms (see Mankiw and Whinston (1986)).
Possible market failure 5 In some market segments there might be excessive entry.
How would a monopolist using the price system be able to supply such a programme as in
Figure 4.3 (B)? Price discrimination is the key. Perfect price discrimination achieves an efﬁcient
allocation. But, to be able to perfectly price discriminate, some conditions should hold. First, the
producer must know each individual’s valuation of the programme. Second, resale by consumers
should be ruled out. The ﬁrst condition is generally violated in practice and the second is very
difﬁcult to implement in an information market (where copy and transport costs are close to
zero). Having said this, however, information markets use other methods to price discriminate.
Two methods are used in practice: windowing and bundling. Windowing is supplying a
programme through different platforms (and possibly at different points in time) for different
prices. Windowing is common practice with entertainment. A movie for example is ﬁrst shown
in cinema’s, then rented as videotape or DVD, then sold as DVD or videotape (or the other way
round), and then sold to pay TV channels and ﬁnally to broadcasting channels. Such a strategy is
less likely to be relevant with information that depreciates very rapidly like news and opinion.
Then bundling is an option. Bundling is combining goods and selling the package for one price.
29 For an elaboration, see Spence and Owen (1977).
30 The next section discusses imperfections in consumer valuation in greater detail.
28In general bundling is not a very efﬁcient outcome as people are ‘forced’ to consume goods they
otherwise would not want. However, given the fact that marginal costs equal zero for much of
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the economics of bundling. For simplicity we assume now that sports and
culture have identical demand functions and both have too high ﬁxed costs for viable production
by a monopolist (so both demand curves are as in ﬁgure 4.3, panel B). Now, consider one
monopolist trying to sell a bundle of S andC. If the valuations for S andC are drawn
independently from for example an uniform distribution, the demand for the bundle looks like
Figure 4.4 panel B. To understand this, think about what the demand for a bundle would look
like if the individual valuation for the two goods is perfectly negatively correlated.31 Then a
horizontal demand curve results. Given a demand curve for the bundle such as in Figure 4.4
panel B, the monopolist prices the bundle at pbundle and easily recoups the total ﬁxed costs
(2xF0).32 Summarising, instead of using heterogeneous prices to price discriminate, bundling
reduces the heterogeneity of demand.33
Remark The relevance of market failures 3 and 4 depends on the ability of producers to price
discriminate.
31 The ultimate sports freak does not value culture and the other way round.
32 If, on the other hand, individual willingness to pay is positively correlated, bundling is not effective as the slope of the
demand curve is steeper.
33 See Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) for a formal exposition.
29The efﬁciency properties of an outcome with price discrimination depend on how well producers
are able to price discriminate. This is ultimately an empirical question (for which there is very
little evidence). A higher degree of price discrimination again has distributional consequences,
but now we cannot ignore them (in panel B of ﬁgure 4.4 most surplus is captured by
producers).34 In many competition policy cases consumer surplus is taken as the important
evaluation variable. This can be discussed, but it is more relevant if the producer surplus adds to
another country’s income; something which is likely in a globalised media landscape.35
Remark Note that if advertising is combined with pay TV, the relevance of the excess
advertising market-failure disappears, as the producers internalise their viewers disutility from
ads by changing their prices.36
Pay TV: pay-per-view or pay-per-channel?
So far we did not distinguish between pay-per-view and pay-per-channel. Pay-per-view implies
that viewers decide whether or not to pay for each separate programme. Hence pay-per-view is
incompatible with a bundling strategy as discussed in the previous section. However, as might be
clear from the exposition on bundling, such a strategy is very proﬁtable for producers. Is it
therefore likely that pay-per-channel is going to prevail? Indeed, as price-undercutting by
pay-per-view channels is not a proﬁtable strategy. To see this, note that a single-programme
producer, such as in panel A of ﬁgure 4.4, is not able to produce at all. Therefore, in case a
pay-per-channel supplier is already present, a pay-per-view producer cannot enter the market
proﬁtably. Indeed, Nalebuff (2000) shows that bundling strategies tend to lead to highly
concentrated markets. So, on the one hand bundling leads to a better (or more diverse)
allocation. But there is a counter effect of bundling: it leads to highly concentrated markets. The
impact of the latter effect on diversity is not a priori clear.
Remark Pay-per-channel is likely to prevail above pay-per-view. The effect of the different
strategies on diversity is not a priori clear.
4.3 The demand side: On quality and independence
Let us ﬁrst discuss quality, as this has both demand and supply side elements in it. Earlier,
quality has been deﬁned as relatively expensive goods (high ﬁxed costs) and (de)merit goods.
We have seen that in general there is a bias against relatively high-ﬁxed-cost goods with a steep
demand curve. So here we only focus on the consumption externality part of quality.
34 Hansen and Kyhl (2001) analyse the welfare consequence of a ban on pay TV.
35 Ultimately, the surplus is captured by the scarce factor, be it talented football players, movie producers or marketing
talents.
36 For an elaboration, we refer to Anderson and Coate (2005).
304.3.1 Consumer choice: externalities
Externalities that are attributed to the consumption of TV-programmes are as follows:
(A) Positive externalities: (i) being informed has a positive effect on the functioning of the
democracy (ii) viewing important events is subject to a positive network externality (iii) there
might be some educational beneﬁt from consuming ’quality’ programmes;
(B) Negative externalities: consuming certain programmes might lead to behaviour that has
negative externalities, like violence, excessive risk taking and so on.
Possible market failure 6 There are some positive and negative externalities related to the
consumption of information.
4.3.2 Consumers: Imperfections in consumption decisions
Above, we discussed several externalities: positive or negative impacts of one consumers’
decision on other consumers, that are not taken into account by the consumer who decides. Here
we discuss some examples of decision making where the consumer is possibly not able to fully
take into account the impact of his consumption decision on himself.
First, the consumption (and trade) of information is difﬁcult as a consumer is not able to fully
assess the relevant characteristics of the good before actually consuming it.
Some information has the characteristic of an experience good. This can lead to biases in
consumption. Consumers might not try enough new programmes, especially if they are costly.
But a rational consumer will maximise his expected value of trying, and thus accepts some
choices that impose ex post a negative value.
Slightly more troubling is that some information has the characteristic of a credence good.
That is, even after consumption, consumers are not able to value the good properly. This is most
easily understood by referring to news and opinion. After watching the news the viewer is
unaware of the accuracy of the news. So consumers might value quality improperly.
Independence of information is also closely related. For viewers it is, for example, difﬁcult to
judge whether product information programmes are biased toward one of the sponsors or
advertisers of the programme.
There exist some market mechanisms that mitigate this issue. If there is a diverse supply
from different sources, some consumers will consume more than one source and thereby act as a
control mechanism.37 Also the different information sources can control each others quality.
Quality and independence is also served by a well functioning reputation mechanism.
Reputation is asymmetric. For ﬁrms to create a good reputation is much more difﬁcult than to
lose it. Obviously, this leads to very careful behaviour on the part of ﬁrms with a good
37 Mullainathan and Shleifer (2004) show that a necessary condition for this mechanism to work is that the ex ante views
are sufﬁciently differentiated across viewers. Fierce competition and limited concentration in supply of news are therefore
important conditions for mitigating the credence problem.
31reputation. A necessary condition for the reputation mechanism to work, is a competitive
market. On the other hand, in a very competitive environment where quality does not pay-off
without a good reputation (as consumers do not recognise it), obtaining a good reputation might
be very difﬁcult (see Akerlof (1970) for a discussion of the existence of markets with
unobservable quality and no reputation).
Possible market failure 7 Due to the imperfection in the consumers’ determination of the
relevant characteristics of the good, consumption might be biased toward low quality goods and
it is uncertain whether the market for high-quality goods exists. This depends on the pay-off of
supplying high quality and the possibility of obtaining a good reputation.
Second, even though the consumer might know the relevant characteristics of the good, he or she
might not know the consequences of consuming certain information or programmes. This class
of ‘consumption failures’ is not literally a market failure, but relates to ‘paternalism’. The
somewhat negative association attached to this term does not reﬂect what we intend to convey,
we just follow the convention. Further discussion will clarify how we interpret paternalism. The
idea that the public broadcaster knows better what is ‘good for you’ to view, is outdated and we
do not challenge this. But there are other notions of paternalism that might still be relevant.
The ﬁrst aspect is that people might be or tend to be short-sighted.38 Again an example to
clarify. Take classical music on TV. For most people it takes time and effort to learn to fully
appreciate it. As people tend to be short-sighted, they put too little weight on the future beneﬁts
of their current consumption. Hence their willingness to pay is not in line with true long term
evaluations. Then such a programme might not be broadcast, even though the social value might
be positive.
The second aspect is that people simply cannot judge well how they are affected by watching
a certain programme. For economists, consumer sovereignty is one of their basic building block,
so this might look like a strong assumption. However, no one will deny that you should protect
children from certain material. And no one would advocate confronting people with porn in
between programmes, for example. Moreover, there generally is large support for bans on
tobacco advertisements. All we want to say here is that it is not entirely obvious where this line
of reasoning stops.
Possible market failure 8 Due to the imperfection in the consumer’s ability to determine the
consequences of viewing certain programmes, ‘market’ failures might arise. These relate to
paternalism.
38 There is ample evidence for this.
324.4 Putting the pieces together
This section analysed the potential market failures in the broadcasting industry. We
distinguished eight different, but sometimes related, market failures.39 The question then arises
if we can ex post ‘rationalise’ the aims of PSB. Table 4.1 shows such an interpretation, by
linking the various market failures to the most common governments aims.
Table 4.1 The link between market failures and the aims of PSB
Possible market failure Most related PSB aims Other relevant PSB aims
1. Underprovision under ad-support Pluralism Quality
2. Excessive advertising
3. Inefﬁcient exclusion under pay TV Accessibility
4. Underprovision under pay TV Pluralism Quality
5. Excessive entry Pluralism
6. Positive and negative consumption externalities Quality Independence
7. Consumption bias towards low quality Independence, quality
8. ‘Paternalism’ Independence, quality
A comparison of pay TV and advertising support
So far we discussed the potential market failures that may arise in the information trade in the
broadcasting industry by discussing pay TV and advertising-supported tv separately. For the
discussion on the future of PSB it is, however, useful to make an explicit comparison of the two
systems.40
Some recent analyses compare the different market forms on dimensions of quality and
diversity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed treatment of the different
modelling strategies. Here we just summarise the important insights with respect to the
comparison of pay TV and ad-supported tv.
The most important insight from the literature is that more variety not always improves
welfare. The production of more varieties of information goods implies that the associated ﬁxed
costs have to be made again for each variety. Hence there is a trade off between diversity and
saving on ﬁxed costs. Whether the market reaches the socially desirable quality and diversity is a
question that we addressed earlier. In general, the answer is no, but then the question is when
pay TV is superior to ad-support.
39 As an additional market failure, Hargreaves Heap (2005) points at the possibility of too low levels of innovation in
broadcasting. Underlying reasons are imperfect property rights, a short time horizon (impatience in ‘trying something
new’) and ‘conformism’, as a tried response to uncertainty (on whether a new program will be succesful or not). We do not
include this market failure here, since its uniqueness to broadcasting is unclear.
40 Recall that we dealt with the difference between pay-per-view and pay-per-channel in section 4.2.2; here we do not
repeat this.
33Waterman (1990) shows that pay TV leads to too much diversity. In the market, the incentive to
introduce an alternative variety is related to the expected proﬁt relative to the ﬁxed costs of
producing the new variety. The socially optimal decision would be taken as follows: the
net-utility of the new variety should outweigh the ﬁxed costs. The entrant, however, does not
take into consideration that he reduces the proﬁt of existing companies (this is the
business-stealing effect, see Mankiw and Whinston (1986)).
We have already seen that an advertisement-sponsored market tends to deliver too low
diversity, as producers can appropriate only a part of the created surplus. Anderson and Coate
(2005) show that the chance of too low diversity increases if the valuation for programmes is
large relative to the scope for advertisement revenues. When programmes are bad substitutes, the
risk of insufﬁcient diversity increases. But too much variety is also conceivable in an
ad-supported market. Too much variety can be expected if the expected proﬁt of introducing a
new variety is larger than the social beneﬁt of the new variety. This is more likely if the
programmes are good substitutes and if there is much possibility to advertise.41 Berry and
Waldfogel (1999) show for the American radio market (that is an ad-supported market) that the
business stealing effect is in fact relevant.
Anderson and Coate (2005) also show that variety with pay TV is at least as high as with
advertisement-sponsored media. Does this imply that welfare is always higher with pay TV? In
many cases: yes. The exception to this rule is when pay TV excludes many potential viewers and
when advertisement-sponsored tv already offers excessive variety.
Another aspect of the supply of programmes is quality. Higher quality is generally
interpreted as products with higher ﬁxed costs. Waterman (1990) shows that when ﬁrms can
invest in quality, they choose too low quality levels in most cases. He shows that this distortion
is more severe in an ad-supported market than in a pay TV market. Bourreau (2003) adds to the
work of Waterman the following: with pay TV less duplication arises, because by
counterprogramming suppliers limit the ﬁerceness of price competition. With
advertisement-sponsored TV, the incentive to limit competition is less strong, which makes
duplication more likely.
41 This is business stealing in an ad-supported model.
345 A changing media landscape
The media landscape is subject to continuous social, technological and institutional change.
These changes can affect the motivation for PSB, as well as its design. This section focuses on
recent and future trends and analyses their implications for media policy.
5.1 What are the trends?
Technological change has been the main engine for many developments in the media sector. The
most important one of the last decade has obviously been the rise of the internet. By connecting
computers via existing communication networks, the internet offers a highly open and accessible
information and communication system. And although the time consumers spend on media
consumption has been rather constant over the last decades, we see a clear shift from radio and
newspapers to television and internet. Many observers agree that this trend is very likely to
continue.
Given the current capacity of the local infrastructures, the internet is not yet the dominant
medium for all types of content. Only for news and speciﬁc information, the internet is virtually
a fully-grown substitute channel. Existing cable and telephone networks cannot yet sufﬁciently
handle the large information streams that are required to offer, e.g., high quality
video-on-demand. But due to digitalisation of information, the different networks become more
and more able to perform similar tasks. Cable networks can now be used for internet and
telephone, whereas traditional telephone networks are being used for internet. This trend of
convergence is likely to continue as well. Many experts expect that ﬁbreglass will eventually
replace the existing cable and telephone networks, but rapid progress is also being made in
wireless communication technologies.
Setting aside the question of which technology will eventually prevail, it is clear that
innovative efforts will be aimed at increasing the capacity of networks. The reason for this is
purely commercial. Larger capacity will not only allow for offering larger choice sets, it will
also enable ﬁrms to interact more directly with their clients. Different customers can then be
charged different prices for different content packages that better match individual needs.
The production of content is also subject to continuous technological progress. New digital
techniques have led to more quality against lower costs in, e.g., desktop publishing, special
effects and recording and editing. For some activities, such as the production of local news, total
costs decrease as a result of technological change. But in other activities, such as the production
of movies, new technological opportunities lead to rising production costs. For the latest Lord of
the Rings movie, for instance, total costs reached a stunning 278 million euro.42
42 Waterman (2004) elaborates on the relation between quality and total costs of content production.
355.2 What are the consequences?
What do these trends imply for the objectives of media policy and, related, for PSB? The
objective of pluralism and diversity seems to beneﬁt most from the technological trends. Given
capacity constraints, commercial suppliers only focus on the largest (i.e., most proﬁtable) target
groups. But because of the expected growth in distribution capacity (i.e., more channels), the
provision of content to smaller, less proﬁtable target groups becomes more interesting for
suppliers as well. Higher capacity is therefore expected to lead to a more heterogeneous supply.
Furthermore, the increasing possibility to price consumers more directly allows for content
supply that much better accounts for consumer valuation of content. As mentioned, content
supply driven by the advertising mechanism, provides an inferior indication for the valuation of
content. Finally, tailor-made content provision directly implies a better match of demand and
supply at the individual level as well.
The trends have ambiguous effects for the quality objective. On the one hand, increasing
capacity could lead to more high-quality content along the lines mentioned above (i.e., through
servicing of smaller groups and through internalising the valuation of quality). However, the
internet also provides an easily accessible platform for undesirable, low quality content. We may
therefore see more supply of high-quality content with positive externalities, as well as an
increasing supply of ‘bad’ content with potential negative external effects.
An interesting question, particularly in the context of quality, is how accessibility is affected
by the trends. In general, a trend towards more direct pricing goes along with higher
excludability and thus lower accessibility. As it is likely that higher quality will be higher priced,
the accessibility of this type of content will be less as well. Adverse selection effects can then, in
turn, lead to increased accessibility of low quality content.
The independence of media, ﬁnally, is not likely to be seriously challenged by the trends.
Although we have witnessed a large number of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures in the
media sector in the last decade (OECD, 1999), further concentration is not expected. Limits
imposed by competition laws and other legal constraints on cross-ownership will simply impede
this. Only vertical integration, arising from autonomous growth, could continue in the future. As
the efﬁcacy of the reputation mechanism is related to competition levels, the expected
stabilisation of media concentration will probably not signiﬁcantly impair the incentives for
independent content provision. The increased opportunities for direct pricing and the upcoming
ad-avoidance technologies may even be favourable for independence, as content providers
become less dependent on advertisers.
365.3 Any need for PSB in future?
The objectives of the government are related to market failures, as is previously discussed. The
discussion about trends allows us to assess the current relevance of the potential market failures
compared to relevance before the digitalisation. We have summarised the ﬁndings in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 The effect of trends on market failures
Possible market failure Effect of trends
1. Underprovision under ad-support Decreasingly relevant due to rise pay TV
2. Excessive advertising Decreasingly relevant due to rise pay TV
3. Inefﬁcient exclusion under pay TV Increasingly relevant due to rise pay TV
4. Underprovision high quality content under pay TV Decreasingly relevant due to means to price discriminate
5. Excessive entry Unable to assess
6. Positive and negative consumption externalities Control of content production and consumption less effective
7. Consumption bias towards low quality No effect of trends
8. ‘Paternalism’ No effect of trends
The trends seem to stimulate a better allocation in media markets. Pluralism and diversity, as
well as quality, are likely to improve as a result increased distribution capacity and interactivity.
Though whether the market for quality works well is rather uncertain. The incentives for
independent content provision do not seem to be effectively harmed.43 The problem of
externalities will not disappear. In particular the increased opportunities to broadcast or publish
inferior, inaccurate and even harmful content may aggravate the negative externalities problem.
Finally, although the production of merit goods may increase, accessibility of this type of
content may worsen too.
Provided that missing markets are indeed likely to remain and provided that lower
accessibility effectively limits the exposure of ‘inherently good’ content, a PSB will still be
needed to meet the various media policy objectives. There are still potential welfare gains related
to having a PSB. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that these gains can be realised at
sufﬁciently low cost. The next section focuses on important elements of the design which would
suit future PSB best.
43 Especially during the transition from ad-supported TV to pay TV the introduction of ad-avoidance technology might give
producers an bigger incentive to mix ads with content. This can negatively affect independence, as changing the content
in ways favourable for ‘advertisers’ is, with effective ad-avoidance technology, the only way to generate revenues.
37386 Rationales and options for policy
In this concluding section the analyses of the previous sections come together and lead to the
following question: if policy intervention is based on overcoming problems which are the result
of market failures, and if these market failures become less relevant due to a changing landscape,
there might be a need to redeﬁne media policy.
6.1 Objectives are partially met by the market...
We have established there are three lines of reasoning which can justify some form of
government intervention in the media market: market failures, redistributional concerns and
paternalism.
The changing media landscape mitigates the market failure problems. Excluding consumers
becomes easier, which opens up options for individual pricing. The spectrum constraint is also
less and less binding, due to broad bandwidths. As discussed, this will lead to increased levels of
diversity and pluralism. Although this might lead to a welfare loss (viewers are excluded,
although the marginal costs of servicing these viewers are zero), it will nevertheless
accommodate the government aims. Missing markets might be serviced too, although this is not
certain. In short, the market for media products will look more like a ‘normal’ market for
tradable goods. Two market failures remain. The external effects of independent and good
quality news provision (the media’s democratic role) are not internalised in the market. And
consumers are still faced with the asymmetric information problem.
For redistributional concerns we have to assess the issue of accessibility. Since exclusion of
consumers could becomes routine rather than exception, access to information becomes harder
(i.e. information gets a positive price, as is the case with other goods in a ‘normal’ market). In
that sense it could be argued that there is a need for PSB, since the nature of PSB is that it is
broadcast on an open channel.44 However, we would argue here that as long as the market
functions properly, information is available at reasonable prices. This guarantees access to a
reasonable extent. As Coase (1961) argues, “(...)if reliance on ability to pay is so unfortunate
when applied to television programmes how much worse it must be when applied to food or
clothing (p. 57).”45
The argument of paternalism or short-sighted consumer decisions is not mitigated in a more
market oriented environment.
44 For the Dutch situation, the discussion of paying for television is somewhat theoretical, since the vast majority of
households already do so: they have a cable subscription. The three PSB channels are available through aerial for free,
but nearly all households prefer to pay for cable. Note however that this is not the same as pay TV, since there is very
limited choice in bundles or in selecting paid content.
45 Compare the newspaper market, where access has never been a government concern. Of course, when public money
is spent on broadcasts, then these should be available on an open channel.
396.2 ...so a diminished role for PSB remains...
So all in all two issues remain that the PSB might provide a solution for: external effects and
paternalism. Both relate to a provision of information that consumers do not have an immediate
demand for, but for which they need to be ‘seduced’. This implies that supply might fall short.
In terms of the government aims, the largest challenge will no longer be in pluralism and
diversity, nor in accessibility. Independence remains a concern, but if competition is sufﬁcient
and the reputation effect works well, the PSB’s role in providing independent information can be
limited. The largest concern therefore is quality. Also, it could be that the levels of pluralism and
diversity that the market provides for, are still not enough to match the ‘government preferences’.
In terms of content markets, we can pinpoint a role for the government in news and opinion
products and cultural information. The externalities and paternalism arguments as well as the
government’s quality aim are concentrated on these two markets.
All this means a different role for PSB. There is an important additional argument for this: since
there is convergence among platforms or media outlets, the focus on television alone for
securing government objectives is no longer self-explanatory. After all, the distinguishing
feature that would lead to channel-speciﬁc policies is limited substitutability for consumers. But
if an article in the newspaper is seen as an alternative to a news broadcast on television, then why
should these be treated as separate markets? In the extreme case, if they are perfect substitutes,
then an independent newspaper industry is enough to secure the government aim of
independence; an additional demand for independent television would then not be necessary.
The role of the government is increasingly resembling its role in most other economic
sectors. From several angels the importance of healthy competition is stressed. In securing this
an extra keen eye should be out for possible abuse of dominant positions. Namely, the
combination of high ﬁxed costs and low marginal costs implies economies of scale, which in
turn implies an advantage for consolidation. This is not in itself a problem, but it stresses the
importance of well executed competition law.
If competition law is not sufﬁcient to meet government aims, general media policies are the
next logical step. Remaining government aims could then be targeted with media-speciﬁc
policies. Policy options are positive regulations (e.g. programme requirements, quotas), negative
regulations (e.g. bans on advertising and negative-externality content) and forms of
subsidisation. The trade off is always between intervening towards government goals and not
inﬂuencing programming. This is due to the fear of government failure: the risk that the
government will make the wrong choice. This is easy to envisage for cultural content for
example, as with news and opinion, where it is just not desirable that the government has a say in
content. Given these considerations, a public broadcasting service is a viable option, since it
combines a general government mandate with some form of lump sum subsidy.
406.3 ...which can be accommodated by a PSB light
The challenge for PSB is to provide programmes that are additional to market provision, and still
able to attract audiences. The main focus of a PSB light would be on high quality programming
of news and cultural content.
There are a number of advantages to a PSB light. Because of its limited mandate, the
remaining commercial channels can freely compete on other programme categories. The
possible market distortions that occur in the commercial sector due to public provision are
minimised. Most likely the commercial channels will also offer some form of news and culture,
in which they - presumably - take into account the ‘quality standard’ that the PSB is setting in
the market. In this way, a broader audience than just PSB-watchers would beneﬁt. Also, the
costs of a PSB light can be lower, since the range of programmes that it offers is smaller.
Additionally, a PSB light can establish a clear proﬁle. This proﬁle will be helpful in trying to
attract and ‘seduce’ the public to watch the PSB.
The issue of government failure (risk of making the wrong choice) is not necessarily removed
by establishing a PSB light. Providing a mandate is hard - ex ante - as it is difﬁcult to deﬁne what
good cultural and news programmes are. Even ex post it is hard to assess quality objectively. A
solution would be to give the PSB light a performance contract with a clear but general mandate,
in which objective goals (e.g. minimum audience shares among certain groups) are written into
the contract alongside more subjective ones. The performance can then be assessed on both these
criteria; the more objective a criterion is, the more direct it can be linked to ﬂexible ﬁnancing.
An expert committee independent from the PSB and the government can assess the quality of the
PSB performance afterwards. This way the PSB gets a clear mandate, together with an incentive
to perform well and reasonable security about its future (due to the lump sum part of the budget).
An advantage is that the government is also forced to specify its aims in a clear way.
Let us brieﬂy return to the different varieties of the PSB models, as discussed in section 2. The
choice for programme requirements formulated in terms of additionality is a necessary step
towards a PSB light. However, none of the three varieties have a mandate as focussed as the
proposed PSB light. The BBC is perhaps the closest in terms of mandate, although it is less
focussed than we suggest. The BBC probably also is a good example of how to combine an
independent position with a (relatively) clear mandate. In terms of independence, the German
model is interesting in the way supervision on the various requirements is designed. Note
however, that although ‘outsourcing’ this task minimises the risk of government failure in the
classical sense, the tension between interference (supervision) and independence still remains.
An interesting feature of the Dutch model, and to a lesser extent the German model, is that
the design is tailored to revealing consumer preferences. The rationale for this is clear: if the
market for broadcasting does not reﬂect these preferences well, it is very useful to have another
41mechanism in place. Apart from the question whether consumers’ preferences are in fact
revealed and translated into programming, a fundamental question is attached to this approach:
in the digital age, is it the major role of PSB to respond to consumer preferences? We have
argued that it is not. In the future broadcasting market, supply will arguably be more responsive
to consumer preferences. The PSB should be focussing on the remaining tasks that the market
cannot provide for: internalising externalities and providing quality content.
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